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HOW FAR SHALL THE JUSTICE AND RIGHTS OF
THE PARTICULAR CAUSE PREVAIL OVER A
STRICT APPLICATION OF ESTABLISHED RULES
OF LAW?*
It has grown to be the fashion in these modern days, both by
tongue and by pen, to criticise public men so openly, whether in
the executive, legislative or judicial branches of government, that
we may properly inquire whether, in this respect at least, liberty
has not degenerated into a license that may in time undermine true
liberty itself. Unrestrained license may lead freedom and liberty
into the maelstrom of anarchy, and, if not checked, might make it
possible for us to believe that the day may come when the real
liberties of man will be better preserved by a form of government
so centralized and strong that our forefathers would have ranked it as
tyrannical, yet far less injurious to mankind than a government,
vaunted to be of the people, by the people and for the people, but
in reality so enervated by permissive license as practically to forbid
to its citizens that which we term our inalienable rights, personal
security, personal liberty and the enjoyment of private property.
I need not particularize; every thinking man knows the situation.
Against such possibilities the foremost defenders should be the
priests of the law, the members of the legal profession, and they
the very last to assist the consummation of such an evil. It may
be said that this sounds the alarm too loudly, but not so to this
body when we remember that criticism of judicial authority by the
coadjutor of the Bench-for none other is the Bar-has far more
effect upon the public than that which flows from the pen of the
editor, the pencil of the cartoonist, or the rantings of the demagogue,
the socialist or the modem labor agitator.
We do Well, therefore, to stop for a moment to consider the
question: What is the Bench, and what is the Bar, and in what
manner are they jointly the guardians of the temple of justice?
*This article formed part of an address delivered by the author as
President of the Pennsylvania Bar Association, at the annual convention,
June 29, 1903.
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"Sir," said Horace Binney, "the Supreme Court is the august
representative of the wisdom and justice and conscience of the
whole people in the exposition of their constitution and laws; the
peaceful and venerable arbitrator between the citizens of all ques-
tions touching the extent and sway of constitutional power, the
great moral substitute for force in controversies between the people,
the States and the Union." These words, spoken of the highest
and most powerful court the world has ever known, are proportion-
ately true of all those who wear the spotless ermine on every
appellate or nisi prius bench in this or any other Commonwealth.
Of the honored position to which every lawyer, true to his profession,
is entitled, the eulogium of Lord Coke will suffice: "For thy
comfort and encouragement cast thine eyes upon the sages of the
law that have been before thee, and never shalt thou find any that
bath excelled in the knowledge of the laws but bath drawn from
the fountains of that divine knowledge, honesty, gravity and in-
tegrity; and, by the goodness of God, bath obtained a greater
blessing and ornament than any other profession to their family
and posterity. It is an undoubted truth that the just shall flourish
as the palm tree and spread abroad as the cedars of Lebanon.
Hitherto, I never saw any man of loose and lawless life attain
to any sound and perfect knowledge of the law; and, on the other
side, I never saw any man of excellent judgment in the laws but
was withal (being taught by such a master) honest, faithful and
virtuous. Wherefore, a great lawyer never dies improlis aut in-
testatus, and his posterity continues to flourish to distant gener-
ations."
The Bench and the Bar are joined in upholding the fabric of the
law by securing the administration of that justice of which Webster
said: "It is the greatest interest of man on earth. It is the liga-
ment which holds civilized nations together. Wherever her temple
stands, and as long as it is duly honored, there is a foundation for
social security, general happiness and the improvement and progress
of our race. And, whoever labors on this edifice with usefulness
and distinction, whoever clears its foundations, strengthens its
pillars, adorns its entablatures, or contributes to raise its august
dome still higher in the skies, connects himself in name and fame
and character with that which is, and must be, as durable as the
frame of human society."
Our profession is a great Brotherhood to which belong the
judges. the advocates and the lawgivers of all the ages, and when
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we cast our eyes back along the world's history there appears in
all its glory the might, the majesty, the power of the legal pro-
fession as manifested by this exalted fraternity.
Moses, writing under divine inspiration, gave Israel a system
of laws which will endure with time itself, combining in his person
the brotherhood of the law, for that, as his Pentateuch shows, he
was the inspired lawgiver, the upright judge, and the advocate for
his people even amid the thunderings of Sinai; leaving for all men
of every age a code which contains the basic germs of the civil law,
of our common law and of the statutes of every modem nation.
In the eighth century before Christ, Lycurgus rescued Sparta
from anarchy by a constitution securing a form of government
superior to many. in the old world to-day; a constitution only
excelled by our own, and by which, indeed, ours was in part inspired.
"And though," as has been well said, "the constitution of Sparta
was framed twenty-seven hundred years ago, for a region no larger
than an ordinary county in an American State-a mere speck on
the map of the globe-yet the light of that great legal instrument
has never gone out, but has continued to shine across the vast and
turbulent centuries, like the imperishable beacon of a great light-
house, streaming far out over the ocean as a warning, a guide
and a hope."
Aesthetic and cultured Greece fell early in the struggle of
nations, but her civilization, manifested through her code of laws
and the constitutions written by Lycurgus and Solon, so impressed
itself upon the jurisprudence of her conqueror as to preserve her
fame to all, ages. All-conquering Rome mastered a world in
domain far more extensive than that over which flies our flag, and
in population nearly double that of our Union, yet was preserved
as a Republic for nearly seven hundred years more by her brother-
hood of lawgivers and lawmakers than by her legions; and now
that she lies in the dust there rises from her ruins, higher than
her art and her literature, the towering majesty of her jurisprudence,
her codes, h~r laws and her system of government. Of the period
of the dawn of Christianity. the name of Cicero, the great leader
of the Roman Bar, and among the most exalted of all the lawyers
the world has ever known, is inscribed higher than those of her
historians, Tacitus and Livy, and of her poets, Virgil, Juvenal and
Horace. Five hundred years later, when her fate seemed imminent,
she was revived almost to her pristine strength by the renowned
Tustinian, an emperor whose victories in battle restored the ancient
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borders of his country and whose patronage of the arts decorated
the Imperial City much more lavishly than had any of his prede-
cessors; yet all that is as naught to-day compared with the immortal
Code Justinian, the foundation, and largely the body of the civil
law which governs modem Europe, and from whose Pandects and
Institutes even the fountains of our common law have ever been
re-enforced.
Of all England's kings the historian gives the place of honor
to Alfred; but he was not Alfred the Great because he drove the
Norseman and the Dane from Albion's shores, nor alone for that
he ruled wisely and well, but chiefly because he was the greatest
lawgiver of his age, himself compiling a code of laws, writing
valuable legal treatises, and placing the administration of justice
upon a stable foundation by his selection of able and honest judges
and the revival and firm establishment, if not by the origin of the
jury system, not materially differing from the form in which we
know it to-day. The swords that wrung Magna Charta from
King John at Runnymede would have accomplished nothing en-
during had not that famed instrument been penned by a lawyer's
hand. Shaven priest as he was, Stephen Lqngton wrote with the
pen of a giant of our brotherhood when he indited the Great
Charter of Liberties. Who but a lawyer of the highest rank in
our profession could have written: "No freeman shall be seized,
or imprisoned, or dispossessed, or outlawed, or in any way de-
stroyed; nor will we condemn him, nor will we commit him to
prison, except by the legal judgment of his peers, or by the law of
the land"? And no words could better define the proper adminis-
tration of justice and the conduct of the judiciary, whether in a
court presided over by the ancient feudal -king or by the modem
elected judge. than those which Langton wrote into that charter:
"To none will we sell, to none will we deny, to none will we delay
justice." These are the basic principles of liberty, controlled by
law, which with the other sentences of that immortal document ex-
tend to every department of jurisprudence, covering the correlative
rights and duties of crown and subject; of all the domestic relations,
of debtor and creditor, of principal and surety, of decedents' estates,
of courts of superior and inferior jurisdiction, of taxation, of
military duty, and of the law merchant.
With Magna Charta stand the Petition of Rights, the Bill of
Rights, the writ of Habeas Corpus and our Constitution as 'monu-
ments of the brotherhood to which, judge and advocate alike, we
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yield our homage; a fraternity resplendent with the names of
Cicero and Justinian, of Coke and Bacon, of Mansfield and Erskine,
of Marshall and Webster, of Gibson and Binney, of Sharswood
and Black, and of all the host of those who have gone before,
leaving to us this noble inheritance to be passed on to those who
come after us untarnished and undiminished in splendor.
Do we realize that in addition to the fealty mutually due
the members of this brotherhood of our profession-the fidelity of
Bar to Bench, the courtesy of judge to advocate-as patriotic
citizens, we owe a debt of gratitude to the courts for that which
they have done to ensure our liberties and maintain our govern-
ment? For it is a truth everyone must admit that all of the glory
of the establishment and preservation of our Union of States is
not due alone to our honored Presidents, our gallant leaders of
army and navy, or to the statesmen in our halls of Congress. Theprinciples enunciated by our courts on the vital questions of con-
stitutional and civil liberty are shining lights in our national
progress. In the infant days of the Republic a mere stroke of the
pen might have overthrown our fabric, while the utterances of
the judicial branch of our government had a large share in cement-ing the Union. Not surrounded by glories of martial array, nor
amid the plaudits of Congress, unnoticed by the press and not
specially marked by the historian, but patiently, and in the seclusion
of chambers, the destiny of our nation was forged by the pens of
the great jurists who adorned our Federal Bench. Beside our
nation's George Washington we must place our brotherhood's John
Marshall, and enroll the names of Story and of Cushing, of Living-
ston and of Chase, high in our halls of fame. When we study
our national history closely and analytically we cannot fail todiscover that the judicial department of our government it was
that stayed and maintained our tottering columns of state as they
were swaying toward ruin, and with judicial deliverance of sound
wisdom and statesmanlike strength cemented our structure to
withstand the storms and revolutions of any age.
I have reviewed, though but feebly, the glorious history of our
noble brotherhood of judges and lawyers, that I might more strongly
accentuate the duty of always evincing the highest honor and
respect ever due from Bar to Bench not only because of professional
pride in .preserving the prestige of our ancient and honorable
fraternity of the law, but that in so doing we sustain liberty itself,
uphold justice and maintain the due and proper administration of
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the law; for it must be admitted that the permanency of our in-
stitutions depends solely upon *the majesty of the law, which will
be preserved only so long as the Bar maintains such a proper respect
for the Bench as will thereby command full obedience to its decrees
from all the world. De Tocqueville, writing in 1835, seemed to be
distrustful of the permanency of our institutions, but considered
that the conservatism of the American Bar was a guarantee of
their stability, and that our Bench and Bar constituted our best
aristocracy, being founded upon intellectuality and morality. Ex-
cepting that in some respects our brotherhood has lowered its
prestige by laxity in guarding its portals-a fault more evident in
Bar than in Bench-and by a growth of commercialism in some
quarters, which, if not checked, will destroy the highest and best
ethics of our profession, it is certain that if the distinguished author
of "Democracy in America" could view us from the same standpoint
seventy years later, he would find that our institutions are still
safe-guarded by the legal profession, in that the citadel of justice
is manned by the sworn servants of the law, and that so long as
they are faithful to their duty her walls will ever protect the insti-
tutions which have combined to make ours the foremost nation of
the day or of history.
The stream can rise no higher than its source, hence the Bar
makes the Bench what it is, and when .the profession, true to its
great trust, raises its voice in the selection of the judiciary with
such vigor that all men, even the modem politician, must obey,
and having placed its choice in the highest position man can
hold-because he who judges others exercises one of the highest
attributes of the Almighty himself-continues to support the Bench
in the exercise of its duties, justice will be properly administered,
the law upheld, and thereby government maintained. So, like-
wise, if any one chosen to this great office becomes unfaithful to
his trust, no matter how high may be his station, the duty of the
profession is equally mandatory, and as a judge that man must
cease to exist.
With all deference, I venture to suggest the qualities of the
ideal judge as the one who listens patiently, weighs justly and
judges wisely; not always bound by
"The codeless myriad of precedent,
That wilderness of single instances,"
irrespective of modem progress and changed conditions, yet un-
willing to abandon the rule of stare decisis even by modifications
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which "eat out the heart of the rule," in order that particular facts
may prevail, where the former decision has become a rule of
property by which men have bought and sold, contracts have been
prepared, estates passed, domestic relations determined and the
profession practiced for many years; yet, not bound by bands of
iron so rigid and unbending that in order to uphold a stern rule
an injustice will be done so great that the conscience of man will
be shocked. In short, the judge who knows both how to measure
what is right and just by the law, as well as to measure the law
by whadt is just and right. Again, the ideal judge, whether at
nisi prius or on appeal, is not truly appraised by popularity, for
it was well said in ancient days that "a popular judge is a deformed
thing, and plaudits are fitter for players than for magistrates."
And with this sage advice may go the words of another ancient
master who would warn his judges thus:
"Draw thy learning out of thine books, not out of thine head.'
"Mix well the freedom of thine own opinion with due reference
to the opinion of thy fellows."
"Be a light to jurors to open their eyes, not a guide to lead
them by their noses."
"Affect not the opinion of pregnancy and expedition by an
impatient and catchy hearing of the counsellors at the bar."
After all is said, may we not sum up the qualities of an ideal
judge in the answer of one of England's greatest premiers to a
request for a judicial appointment? "If your friend is a gentleman
I will give him this judgeship; if he knows a little law, then so
much the better." That eminent statesman must have borne in
mind the fact that England's greatest jurist, the immortal Mansfield,
excepting America's Marshall and Pennsylvania's Gibson without
a peer, had never been ranked while at the bar as its leader or as
a brilliant advocate, while, on the other hand, the wonderfully
gifted and versatile Lord Bacon and the illustrious Erskine were
sad failures when elevated to the Bench. Of Bacon, his biographer
said: "No man ever sat in Westminster Hall with a truer judicial
understanding; no one ever more thoroughly understood the duties
of a judge, while his professional acquirements and experiences
were sufficient to dispose of all the variety of business which came
before him." As an illustration of his ability we need only recall
that the chancery system of practice in Pennsylvania is founded
upon and almost entirely drawn from -his famous "Orders." Yet
he descended to the lowest servility in personally soliciting the
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woolsack from James I., and so disgraced his great office that he
was dtismissed for receiving from suitors bribes to the amount of
many thousands of pounds. Of him the poet said:
"If parts allure thee, think how Bacon shined,
The wisest, brightest, meanest of mankind."
It cannot be denied that Erskine was one of the two greatest
advocates the world has ever known-Webster alone equalling him
in oratory while surpassing him in profundity. Called to the bar
as a mere youth he made his debut in Rex v. Baillie with such
success that he was immediately overwhelmed with retainers, and
for twenty-seven years led the English Bar, unequalled by any
who there preceded or followed him; but the deliverance of the
Great Seal to him was but the equivalent of the termination of his
glory, for in the six months he held the office of Lord Chancellor
he delivered no opinions of importance and resigned the woolsack
conscious of his inability to fill that exalted office, and, following
the custom of his country that forbids the Bar to the retired judge,
soon sank into comparative obscurity, his position in Parliament
being but mediocre.
No judge could wish for a higher eulogium than that pronounced
of Mansfield: "When he goeth up to the judgment seat he taketh
care to put on righteousness as a glorious robe, and to render his
tribunal a fit emblem of that eternal throne of which justice and
judgment are the habitation." So always for every great judge
there is emblazoned on his shield the motto of Chevalier Bayard:
"Sans peur et sans reproch-e," to which in these modem days may
well be added "et sans approche," proclaiming to the world that
impartial justice will be meted out to all men alike, indifferent to
the frowns of power, the temptations of corruption and the subtle
artifices of practiced ingenuity.
It is a common fashion to measure men of the day with those
of other times, whether statesmen, soldiers or jurists, to the dis-
paragement of the modem, as if the present with all its progress
in things material must have retrograded in the moral and mental
strength of its leaders in the science of statesmanship, of war, or
of jurisprudence. Yet it is undoubtedly true that those whom we
revere as the legal giants of other times were not without criticism
from their contemporaries, and that their judgments may have been
objected to almost as freely as are those of to-day. The novelist,
Charles Lever, puts this very cleverly in his Martins of Cro' Martin,
where he gives us this anecdote of the Irish Exchequer: "The
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Chief Baron had overruled every objection made by Counsellor Rep-
ton, and at last declared he wouldn't hear any more citations what-
soever. 'But I have a stronger case still,' insisted the Counsellor.
'I'll not hear it, sir,' retorted the Court. 'It is in Crewe & Fust,
Term Reports, page 1438.' 'I don't care where it is, sir.' 'In a
charge delivered by Lord Eldon.' 'Oh, let us hear my Lord Eldon,'
said Plumridge, the puisne judge, who was rather ashamed of the
Chief Baron's severity; 'let us hear What my Lord Eldon may
have said.' 'Here it is, my Lord,' said the Counsellor, opening
the volume and laying his hand on the page; 'Crewe and Fust's
Pleas of the Crown, page 1438, my Lord Elden says, "I may here
observe that the Courts of Law in Ireland are generally wrong; the
Court of Exchequer is always wrong.' '...
After all, is not this criticism of Bench by Bar one of the
marks of the advocate of which the active lawyer cannot entirely
free himself? The battle is over and lost, but the warrior must
keep his sword is hand and lance in rest, and is unable until after
its more vivid memories are past to review his cause calmly, when,
if he can do so dispassionately and judicially, he must admit that
much of his earlier criticism of the decision was unwarranted. Let
any lawyer honestly review the causes he has lost in the appellate
courts, applying judicial interpretation and divorcing himself en-
tirely from all partisanship, and he will find that but very few were
unjustly or improperly decided. He will discover that there was
another standpoint, not without merit, and while he vigorously
maintained his own, and at the time believed it should have been
adopted, he cannot now say on his honor and conscience that the
decision was without reason or justice. The sum of the matter
is that so long as our judges hold the bench without reproach and
without approach the fountains of justice will remain undefiled,
and while in the hour of defeat we may not feel that justice has
been done our client, we cannot conscientiously say when we have
viewed the question impartially, that the decision would not have
been ours had we been charged with its adjudication.
This criticism of judicial decision by the unsuccessful advocate
is of but little moment in comparison with an arraignment of the
Bench of Pennsylvania upon an indictment charging them with a
fault alleged to be destructive of the rights of suitors and of the
proper administration of the law. It has been said by a leader of
the Bar of that Commonwealth, a lawyer of profound wisdom and
the highest legal attainments, that the modern tendency of the
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courts is to adjudicate causes by their particular equities, rather
than by "the knowne certaintie of the law;" to be influenced by
facts conducive to judgments based upon what would seem to the
courts just and right in the particular case, rather than to be eon-
trolled by the strict application of settled legal principles. This
method of administering law, he tells us, is more Oriental than
Anglo-Saxon, increasing commercialism at the Bar by encouraging
litigation, and, if not restrained, bringing us to a condition where
no man will know what his rights are; fostering a disrespect for and
-discontent against all law, and resulting in the loss of public con-
fidence in the courts to be shown by the refusal to continue for long
terms our faithful judges. Coming from so high a source, we do
well to stop to consider this important matter, and, if we are likely
to suffer the pains and penalties suggested, to join in the alarm.
First of all: What is "the knowne certaintie of the law ?" It
may be questioned if there ever was or will be any certainty in
this science; its very nature denies it that quality. It was Coke
who gave this label to the law, but we may well doubt if he found
its substance, and if his age, far less complex than ours and existing
under conditions much more simple, could not determine this
"knowne certaintie of the law," how much less may we? He
tells us that "fifteen books of treatises and as many volumes of
reports" then completed a legal library. If uncertainty in adjudi-
cations prevailed then, what of our times when we live under
conditions of wonderful development and variety, and Coke's thirty
law books have multiplied into as many thousands? Lord Coke
may well stand for an example of lawyers of his class; learned,
profound, honest and wise, and who would measure what is right,
just and fair between man and man by the rigid rules of law,
rather than to measure the law by the rules of justice and right.
In short, with them whatever is custom is necessarily right, and
that which is not in accordance with custom is utterly wrong.
Indeed, is not that a mental characteristic of our English cousins
to-day in many matters of manners and modes of life? It was
Coke who said that law was "the very embodiment of common
sense," a saying of his that may be ranked with the one first quoted,
yet the didactic mould of his mental processes led him to absurdities,
and plain common sense has often declined to accept his legal princi-
ples. Perhaps the most glaring example of arrant nonsense and
gross injustice surviving from the days of judges like Coke is the
infamous Rule in Shelly's case, by which we in this enlightened age
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are compelled to practice, and which we have time and again
known to have robbed the deserving, and utterly destroyed the
testator's intent, because, forsooth, a rule of law must be upheld
and the judges forbidden to apply equitable principles to the facts
in a particular case in order that justice may be done and the right
prevail. I know of no better illustration of the "knowne certaintie
of the law" than this, often resulting, as Judge Black said of the
New York Code, "in law on the rampage and justice bedevilled."
Of the adherence to settled rules of law, it is admitted by all
hands that certain legal principles have been established-although
not all uniformly in every court of last resort-and to those princi-
ples additions are constantly being made, and so far as they may
be conscientiously applied, must prevail; but it may well be asked
where is the legal principle that can stand the strain of time unless
it be bottomed and fastened upon natural justice ?-that which we
call equity, because in this sense it is indeed "the correction of that
wherein the law by reason of its universality is deficient." Rules
of law may be firmly declared, and to them we must bend the knee
of obedience, but unless they have for their foundation a justice
which appeals to man's conscience, they are as unstable as the
shifting sands of the sea. And herein is the very warp and woof
of the question at issue.
The maintenance of a "knowne certaintie of the law" is practi-
cally an impossibility, and against that saying of Coke may be
set up a still older one, now gone into a proverb: "The glorious
uncertainty of the law." Upon many questions these uncertainties
are fundamental, arising from the very nature of the law, and are
not to be overcome. The differences in human reasoning, as well
as in standpoint and environment, necessarily produce these un-
certainties, whether in construction or in administration. A divine
law was given man, yet that law receives a different construction
from Christian, Jew and Moslem, each acknowledging its divine
inspiration and accepting the same words. Divinity founded a
church on earth and endowed it with constitution and laws, yet it
remained truly catholic, or universal, for but a comparatively brief
period, dividing into Eastern and Western churches, chiefly on the
construction of but a single idea and the use of but one word, so
unimportant in the scheme of salvation that it may well be doubted
if any but the theologian or those versed in its history know what
is ecclesiastically meant by the filioque. The great Western Church,
never entirely agreed-exampled by the struggles between the
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Anglo-Saxon people and the Roman See-finally split at the Re-
formation on questions of construction and administration, and
those who went their own ways again divided, always on similar
questions, until now the divisions of Christianity are almost countless.
Can we expect human law to be more of a "knowne certaintie" than
that which has been revealed from heaven?
Aside from various modes of reasoning whereby different inter-
pretations are arrived at even under similar conditions, there has
-ever been and always must be an evolution in the law, a progress
in jurisprudence, as there is in forms of government, human thought,
modes of life, manners and customs, and in the arts and sciences
through new discoveries and inventions. That which may have
been a well settled and accepted principle of law at one stage of
human progress would not be tolerated for one moment in these
modern days; the earlier legal treatises are full of such principles,
they are not merely obsolete, they are positively denied by advanced
thought and by the results of experience. The law cannot stand
still any more than can mankind cease to progress; as one goes
forward so must the other, and as human conditions improve and
develop, so, of necessity, must jurisprudence advance. There are
certain principles of natural justice which are as immutable as the
heavens and can never be changed; they have come to us from
antiquity, they will last so long as man walks the earth; and be-
lieving in a just Judge before whom we must all appear, will con-
tinue throughout eternity. These principles no man can change,
no court alter, no judge destroy; they are certain and will so remain.
Other principles, not necessarily founded upon natural justice, but,
rather, artificial rules made for a particular time, for special con-
ditions, or to serve a purpose later found to be but temporary of
transient, must and will change, and it is at this point we may
meet the precise question under discussion.
The foremost and chief principle of all law, and one which
cannot be changed, is that justice is to be done, that that which is
right and just shall alone be decreed. A law that is not just, or
which in its application works an injustice, will not and cannot
survive. It may be hoary with age, it may be written in every law
book, but when it comes in contact with circumstances where its
application would do that which the conscience of man declares to
be unjust it must give way. Such a law may survive for a time,
even for a long time, but its doom is sealed; if the courts refuse
relief from its oppression, the people will sweep it away, and with
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it, perhaps, much else that should not be lost. The Rule in Shelly's
case is the best, or, more properly, the worst illustration. It is a
part of "the knowne certaintie of the law" which has been so vigor-
ously upheld; other States have wiped off that excrescence from
their jurisprudence, even our conservative Commonwealth will not
tolerate it much longer. To the judge who evades that unjust rule
in order that justice may be done under the particular circumstances
of the case, no criticism is due, and his decree is a progression, not
a retrogression in jurisprudence. That which is true of this ancient
and time-dishonored rule is proportionately true of many other
established principles of law.
Rules of law must be promulgated, and, so long as they do no
wrong, must be upheld, but let us not forget the ringing words of
Magna Charta, the Great Charter of our liberties, from which
not one jot or title should be lost: "To none will we sell, to none
will we deny, to none will we delay justice." The barons did not
demand, nor did the learned Chancellor, Stephen Langton, indite
a demand for a "known certaintie of the law," but by point of
lance and edge of sword they dragged from King John that which
he could certainly, albeit none the less unwillingly, grant, namely,
justice. If law in its application and administration is not to be
controlled by justice, then, indeed, are we "stretched upon a pro-
crustean bed" and a "barbed wire fence pens us in the field," and if
we stir on the one or run against the other the sharp prongs and
barbs of the law will pierce us to the quick and soon bring us to
"death's doings."
If we are to have rules of law hard and fast, and are to bind
them so tightly around our judges as to compel them to be followed
by the strictest construction, without conscience and without heart,
then will our courts become mere machines of learning to force the
facts of every cause within those "procrustean" rules, irrespective
of the destruction of natural right, and regardless of that justice
which will then meaninglessly define their official titles, but which
by law and by conscience they have been sworn to uphold; all,
forsooth, that we may have the "knowne certaintie of the law,"
and that the advocates having applied its measuring stick to their
clients' causes may be assured that it may likewise be the means of
adjudication by the Bench, irrespective of the wrongs done to others.
Imagine for a moment what this would mean to the ignorant and
unwary. The shrewd, the learned, the well advised, the unscru-
pulous, could eat up the careless, the ignorant, the trusting, and no
matter how just may be the "particular circumstances of the cause"
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and how much may conscience be shocked by the judgment, it must
be rendered if thereby "the knowne certaintie" is assu-ed. Then, in-
deed, would all our previous conditions and beliefs be reversed, and
justice would become uncertain and law certain. It might then be
that the assurance of justice could only be had on that side of the
temple where the jury are judges both of the law and of the facts,
and where with them established precedent or custom must yield to
whatever they may guess to be right.
It has been suggested that if the tendency of the courts to
adjudge causes by the particular equities of the case be continued,
public distrust may follow, and the electors may refuse to continue
for long terms the otherwise faithful judges. Rather let us look at
the converse of the proposition and if the public come to believe that
the courts are bound by precedent rather than by justice, by rule
rather than by what is just and right, that decisions are made which
shock the conscience and are contrary to that which men believe
to be natural justice, we may see the time when the elective franchise
will compel a statute that the jury shall be the judges of the law
in all cases, whether civil or criminal, and where then, we may well
ask, will there be any certainty either of law or justice?
It is true that there are cases to be found in the reports where
the courts of last resort have departed from established precedent
in order that justice might be done under the-particular circumstances
of the case, and I am glad to be of those who maintain that such a
course is conducive to the proper administration of jurisprudence.
A careful consideration of that class of cases will disclose, I am
firmly convinced, that their adjudication was based upon facts that
permitted justice to be done only by departing from rules of law,
which, if followed, would have been to permit an injustice so gross
as to shock the conscience.
An illustration of this, though no doubt better could be found,
is Carpenter v. Life Insurance Co., 161 Pa. 9, and the same case
174 Pa. 639. At trial the defendant had successfully relied upon
stare decisis, a long line of authority in Pennsylvania, as well as in
the Federal and other courts, that an insurable interest, clearly
defined, was essential to a recovery upon a life policy; adjudica-
tions founded upon a rule of public policy that to permit such con-
tracts would be to put a premium on human life, and that a
wagering policy was but conducive to a desire for the death of the
insured, a desire which in at least one reported case (Mutual Life
Ins. Co. v. Armtrong, 117 U. S. 578) had been followed by its
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felonious accomplishment. In the case cited as an illustration it
was admitted on the trial that "the plaintiff was not a creditor of
the insured, nor a relative, nor connected by ties of blood or
marriage, but only a friend of the insured ;" an admission of fact
which under the established rule of "the knowne certaintie of the
law" put the plaintiff out of court, and the defendant was accord-
ingly dismissed with the premium in its pockets and the policy
unpaid. If on appeal the settled rule of law had been applied, and
natural justice and meritorious right had been disregarded by a
refusal to consider the particular facts of the case, the judgment
must have been affirmed. But it was not affirmed because of those
particular facts which were that the plaintiff, a poor young woman,
had been befriended and educated by the insured and given an
opportunity to earn her livelihood by a respectable occupation. That
she might have some support after his death, and before her technical
education was completed, he gave her this policy on his life, assigning
it to her out and out. Every reason for the application of the rule
was wanting, because in fact her interest was much greater in the
preservation than in the destruction of the life of the insured; but,
measured by the rule of law, she was without legal redress. Be
it said to the credit of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania that
the judgment was reversed, based upon the ground that the insured
was to the plaintiff in loco parentis, although in point of fact she
had been of full age for a number of years. We might quarrel with
the reason for the reversal, 'but not honestly with any judgment
which gave her the money to which she was rightfully entitled.
We may here rest the further discussion of this question, though
it will continue to be raised so long as our profession includes those
who, like their prototype, the inflexible Coke, maintain that rules of
law once established must ever be strictly followed, irrespective
of the wrong done in the particular cause, judging solely from the
head without influence from the heart, and denying the elasticity
of the law to adapt itself to man's changed conditions, as well as
to his environment and progress. But while there is the other
school in our profession, modern though it may be, yet largely in the
majority, we may rest assured that the law will be measured by
what is right and just, compelling its severity to yield to justice
as the basic principle of all law. The duty of the Bar is to demand
purity' in the Bench, and then to uphold it as part of the great
brotherhood of the law to which, judge and advocate alike, we are
solemnly sworn, yet none the less is it the duty of the Bar to hold
the Bench to the strict observance of that obligation of Magna
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Charta, forever binding upon every judge: "To none will we
sell, to none will we deny, to none will we delay justice."
When shall come that great day bringing us all before a Judge
whose justice man can but feebly imitate, we will not ask for that
"certaintie of the law" under which we must all stand condemned,
but rather for that justice and mercy whereby alone we may hope
for an eternal reward, relying upon an assurance of salvation,
"because He hath appointed a day in the which He will judge the
world in righteousness." C. La Rue Munson.
